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Abstract
I evaluate German regulation that requires retail discounters to
guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The reg-
ulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers however claim that
rationing is due to demand uncertainty and thereby undermine the
regulation’s rationale. Indeed, demand uncertainty explains empirical
observations better than a theory of loss leaders. This paper shows,
however, that also under demand uncertainty the regulation has pos-
itive eﬀects. Ultimately, it raises production, which, under imperfect
competition, is beneﬁcial. A strict regulation overshoots its goal when
high demand is relatively unlikely. In this case more sophisticated reg-
ulation is required.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies new German regulation that outlaws an observed ra-
tioning of bargain sales. The regulation is seen as an indirect, more eﬀective
way to enforce the law against loss leaders. Retail discounters claim, how-
ever, that rationing is mainly due to demand uncertainty and, therefore, does
not indicate a practise of loss leaders. This claim raises the question how the
regulation impacts market outcomes when rationing is due to demand un-
certainty rather than loss leaders. I show that, also from the perspective of
demand uncertainty, the regulation has positive eﬀects.
Bargain sales by discounters are a relatively new phenomenon in Ger-
many’s retailing industry. According to the German Retail Association,
HDE, they helped discounters to increase sales in 2002, contradicting the 3.5
percent decline in the overall retail sector.1 This trend continued in 2003.
Recently, the main German players, Aldi and Lidl, have successfully intro-
duced the business model in other countries.2 As a result, the importance
of these non–food bargain sales have risen dramatically. For instance, Aldi,
Germany’s main discounter, now attributes 20 percent of its sales to these
special bargains.3 As a consequence, bargain sales are seen as an important
innovation to Germany’s distribution system. In December 2002, however,
the German ministry of consumer protection expresses concerns that dis-
counters may abuse the bargain sales as “loss leaders” to lure consumers.4
As an indication of such abuse, the ministry notes that bargains have lim-
ited availability and often lead to a rationing of consumers. The practise of
loss leaders is forbidden in Germany, but explicit enforceability is diﬃcult.
Hence, the ministry argued that an eﬃcient, indirect way to limit potential
abuse is to force discounters to guarantee the availability of their bargains.
In July 2004, the ministry’s proposal entered into German law.5 The new law
1HDE, 30th Januar 2003: http://www.einzelhandel.de/servlet/PB/menu/1015217/index.html.
2E.g. Aldi uses the business model in 15 diﬀerent countries, including Australia and
the US. Lidl operates the model throughout the European Union.
3Source: Lebensmittelzeitung 49, December, 5th, 2003.
4Der Spiegel 50/2002, p.19. See also http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/vorab/0,1518,226152,00.html.
5§5(5) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb; BGBl. Teil I/2004, Nr. 32 (7.7.2004),
S. 1414 ﬀ.
2against unfair competition now outlaws an advertising for goods which are
held without appropriate quantities. The respective paragraph, §5(5), ex-
plicitly deﬁnes ”appropriate” as ”a coverage of demand for two days” under
normal circumstances.
Discounters contest the ministry’s accusation that they practise loss lead-
ers. For instance, in its customers service announcement to consumers Aldi-
S¨ ud explicitly writes that they ”plan the availability of bargains very care-
fully.”6 But point out that despite careful planning ”customers’ demand can-
not be exactly predicted,” because it is ”partially aﬀected by factors that are
diﬃcult for us to foresee.” For this reason it may therefore happen that ”when
ordering the quantity of bargains we may under- or overestimate consumer
demand.”
Hence, discounters claim that rationing occurs due to demand uncertainty
and not because of a practice of loss leaders. They substantiate their claim
by pointing out that in many cases bargain sales lead to an oversupply, which
is inconsistent with the practise of loss leaders.7 In fact, there is evidence
that the problem of oversupply has taken such proportions that it now poses
a severe threat to the business model of bargain sales.8 The bankruptcy of
the ﬁrm 4MBO is only one illustration of these problems. This ﬁrm produced
the initially very successful bargain PC, “VolksPC”, of the discounter Plus.
However, in December 2003 it shocked capital markets with its announcement
that, due to a “dramatic decline in PC sales” and “sustained low level of
6Original German text on http://germany.aldi.com/corporate 09/index.html: ”Wir
bem¨ uhen uns intensiv darum, ausreichende Mengen von Aktionsartikeln bereit zu halten.
Wir planen die Mengen der Angebote sehr sorgf¨ altig unter Ber¨ ucksichtigung aller uns zur
Verf¨ ugung stehenden Informationen. Dazu z¨ ahlen insbesondere die Erfahrungen aus vor-
angegangenen Aktionen. Trotzdem kann die Kundennachfrage nie exakt eingesch¨ atzt wer-
den. Ihre Kaufentscheidung wird zum Teil von Faktoren beeinﬂusst, die f¨ ur uns nur schwer
vorherzusehen sind. Es kann daher im Ausnahmefall vorkommen, dass wir bei der Bestel-
lung eines Aktionsartikels die Verbrauchernachfrage unter- beziehungsweise ¨ ubersch¨ atzen.”
7Another observation that contradicts the loss leader theory is that exactly those bar-
gain sales that are sold out and lead to rationing are actually the highly proﬁtable ones.
8E.g. http://www.rp-online.de/public/article/wirtschaft/deutschland/29926. Lebens-
mittelzeitung 49, December, 5th, 2003 reports that, as a rule of thumb, the success of a
discount sale depends on how well the last 20 percent of the units sell.
3consumer spending”, it had to close down its PC manufacturing unit. The
subsequent restructuring led to such losses that the ﬁrm became insolvent
and, two months later, had to ﬁle for bankruptcy.9 In a press statement
4MBO explains that bargain sales require a high volume to be proﬁtable,
but actual demand did not meet these.10
In the light of these claims and the supporting observations, the regulation
should be (re)evaluated from a perspective of demand uncertainty. In partic-
ular, the discounters’ claims raise the question whether the regulation may
actually worsen market outcomes when the main rationale behind rationing
is indeed demand uncertainty and not loss leaders. This paper therefore stud-
ies the eﬀects of the regulation when the underlying reason behind rationing
is, in fact, demand uncertainty. I show however that also in this case the
regulation has positive eﬀects. As it increases production, it is potentially
welfare enhancing in any market setting with incomplete competition.
Although German bargain sales are practised by diﬀerent discounters,
they all follow more or less the pattern of Aldi, the initiator of the Ger-
man bargain sales. Every week Aldi announces a set of products that it will
oﬀer in the coming week. The announcements are nation wide and explic-
itly stipulate prices. The products themselves do not belong to the store’s
usual selling stock and their supply is limited. Although the type of product
varies extremely and ranges from PCs and DVD/MP3 players to clothing
and indoor plants, bargain sales have been especially successful for electronic
products. A prime example was a bargain sale of personal computers in the
last quarter of 2002. Ordering these PCs from the supplier Medion, the dis-
counter managed to sell 300,000 units in its weekly sale. Medion thereby
became Germany’s market leader in PCs.11 The fact that these discounters
normally sell groceries and have little expertise in, for example, computers
gives further credence to their claim that they act under demand uncertainty.
9Sources: DGAP-Ad hoc statements of 17.12.03, 27.02.04, and 01.03.04; accessible at
http://www.dgap.de/.
10Source: http://www.golem.de/0312/28978.html.
11Source Gartner-Dataquest. See also:
http://www.golem.de/showhigh.php?ﬁle=/0301/23748.html&wort[]=medion
4It is also natural that demand uncertainty plays a much larger role to these
discounters than to a specialized retailer, who may collect information about
unexpected changes in demand from his day to day sales. This information
is unavailable to a discounter who sells the product at most once every six
months.
Since the primary focus of this paper is on the eﬀect of regulation and
the interaction between a discounter and its consumers, I will disregard any
strategic eﬀects vis-a-vis other potential producers and treat the discounter
as a monopolist.12 The monopoly setting clearly illustrates the eﬀects of the
regulation under demand uncertainty, but is not crucial for the results. Ul-
timately, the regulation induces the ﬁrm to increase output. Since ﬁrms in a
setting with imperfect competition tend to choose a suboptimally low quan-
tity, the regulation is beneﬁcial if the increase is not too extreme. Available
evidence strongly suggests that, despite increased entry, the market is still
characterized by imperfect competition.13
A theoretical analysis of monopolistic behavior under demand uncertainty
may be found in Mills (1959), Karlin and Carr (1962), Zabel (1970) and
Young (1978). Applications of these models include a study of stochastic in-
ventory control (Whitin (1955), Petruzzi and Dada (1999)), capacity choices
(Smith (1969)), resale price maintenance (Deneckere et. al (1996)), and price
dispersion (Dana (1999)). The question of regulating availability in a model
with demand uncertainty has, however, not been studied. Economic litera-
ture has also studied models of sales and advertisement (e.g. Butters (1977),
Varian (1980), Bester (1994)). However, these models are not directly re-
lated to the current paper, because they are based on search costs and/or
imperfectly informed consumers.
12The monopoly assumption is appropriate in settings in which the ﬁrm has a short run
production opportunity to beneﬁt from a drastic cost reduction due to extreme economies
to scale. The importance of economies to scale is supported by the statement of 4MBO that
“large sales campaign volumes are essential for generating proﬁts with discount computers”
(DGAP–ad–hoc statement on 17.12.2003; accessible at http://www.dgap.de).
13Lebensmittelzeitung 49 reports that bargain sales products have proﬁt margins of 35
to 40 percent.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
a simple monopoly model with demand uncertainty. As a ﬁrst step, Section
3 analyzes the ﬁrm’s behavior if it concentrates on the low state of demand
only. In Section 4, I study the outcome under regulation, where the ﬁrm
is forced to guarantee availability. Section 5 studies the optimal rationing
behavior of a ﬁrm which is free of regulation. Section 6 compares the eﬀect
of regulation by contrasting the results of Section 4 and Section 5. Section 7
concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Setup
Consider a ﬁrm producing a good under demand uncertainty; the ﬁrm has to
commit to a uniform price, p, and a quantity, q, without knowing the exact
demand.14 To make this more precise, let α denote the probability that the
consumers’ willingness to pay, v, is uniformly distributed over [0,1] and let
1 − α represent the probability that the consumers’ willingness is uniformly
distributed over the interval [−1/4,3/4].15,16 Hence, demand is high with
probability α, while with probability 1 − α demand will be low. The ﬁrm
operates a production function with a constant marginal costs of c ∈ (0,1/2).
Fixed costs are zero.
The exact timing is as follows:
t=1: The ﬁrm chooses a price quantity combination (p,q).
t=2: The state of demand realizes.
14Dana (1999) notes that under demand uncertainty ﬁrms may have an incentive to use
non–linear prices. Yet, German discounters typically commit to a single uniform price
that is independent of the quantity sold. It is, therefore, more appropriate to limit the
ﬁrm’s pricing strategy to uniform prices.
15These speciﬁc assumptions lead to simple demand structures that allow a straight-
forward and tractable analysis. The speciﬁc distributions are chosen to prevent corner
solutions and ensure that internal solutions lead to positive demand.
16With free disposal a consumer can always guarantee himself the outside option. An
explicit consideration of this would yield a mass point of 1/4 at v = 0, but this does not
aﬀect results in any way.
6t=3: Consumers decide whether to buy the product.
In order to buy the product, potential consumers need to travel to the
ﬁrm’s outlet and incur positive transportation costs of t, where t < 3/4−c.17
The consumers’ outside option not to buy the product is normalized to zero.
Because demand is uncertain, the ﬁrm faces a dilemma. If it chooses
a price quantity combination (p,q) that satisﬁes consumers’ demand in the
high state, it will be unable to sell all its produced units if demand turns
out to be low. That is, some of the produce will go to waste and, given the
positive marginal cost of production c, the ﬁrm had been better oﬀ producing
less.18 On the other hand, if the ﬁrm chooses a combination (p,q) to ensure
that the entire produce is sold in the low state, there will be an excess of
demand if demand turns out to be high. In this case, the ﬁrm would have
been better oﬀ by choosing a larger quantity. Eﬀectively, the ﬁrm faces a
trade–oﬀ between producing too few products in the high state and too many
in the low state.
If the ﬁrm chooses a price quantity combination that leads to an excess of
demand in the high state, there is rationing. In this case, there must be some
rule by which consumers are rationed. For bargain sales the appropriate rule
seems to be proportional rationing, where all consumers who arrive at the
shop receive the product with equal probability. As is well known, this rule
leads to an ineﬃcient allocation of products and there exists gains of trade
between consumers. However, for bargain sales such renegotiation does not
seem to take place in practise.
3 Focus on Low Demand
It is instructive to start the analysis by considering a ﬁrm that focuses exclu-
sively on the low state of demand and disregards the possibility to increase
17For c + t > 3/4 there exist no gains of trade in the low state of demand and the
existence of this state is immaterial.
18The assumption that unsold products are simply waste is an extreme, but straightfor-
ward illustration of a depreciation of the product’s value. The crucial assumption is that
the ﬁrm is unable to recoup his costs c for an unsold unit.
7production to sell more units in the high state.19 In this case, the ﬁrm chooses
a price quantity combination (p,q) which covers exactly the demand in the
low state; more production leads to waste in the low state, while less pro-
duction leads to a loss of potential demand. Hence, an exclusive focus on the
low state of demand renders the trade–oﬀ between producing too few or too
many products trivial. It leads to exactly the right number of units for the
low state and too little production in the high state.
As a consequence, consumers who visit the shop in the low state of de-
mand are sure to receive the product. Hence, given a price combination (p,q)
that satisﬁes potential demand, a consumer v will buy the product if
v − p − t ≥ 0.
Consequently, all consumer with a willingness to pay that exceeds ¯ v ≡ p + t
buy the product. Since the willingness to pay in the low state is uniformly
distributed over [−1/4,3/4], it follows that demand is
Dl(p) = 3/4 − p − t.
Hence, given that the ﬁrm chooses a price quantity combination which matches
exactly the demand in the low state, he restricts attention to combinations
(p,Dl(p)). Since for any such combination he sells Dl(p) units both in the
low and the high state, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
Π1(p) ≡ (p − c)Dl(p).
Consequently, the monopoly price, which maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, is
p
∗
1 ≡ (3 + 4c − 4t)/8.
Proposition 1 The optimal price quantity combination that satisﬁes the de-




1) units are available, the outcome of Proposition 1 implies
that consumers are rationed if demand turns out to be high. In this case,
the ﬁrm would have been better oﬀ, if he had produced more units.
19Whether this selling strategy is actually optimal I address in Section 5.
84 Regulating Availability
This section analyzes the ﬁrm’s pricing behavior, when it is forced to guar-
antee the availability of the product to all potential consumers. Basically,
it reﬂects the counter part of Section 3, because the ﬁrm’s choice must now
ensure that demand in the high state is fully covered. Obviously, the ﬁrm
will not choose a higher quantity and, due to the assumed regulation, the
ﬁrm is unable to produce less. In contrast to the previous section, the ﬁrm
will therefore produce too many units if demand turns out to be low.
Under regulation rationing does not occur. Hence, in both states of de-
mand a consumer with a willingness to pay that exceeds ¯ v will buy the
product. Consequently, the demand of consumers in the high state is
Dh(p) ≡ 1 − ¯ v = 1 − p − t.
Given that the ﬁrm is forced to guarantee availability, it therefore chooses
some price quantity combination (p,Dh(p)). As the ﬁrm sells only Dl(p)
units when demand turns out to be low, the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt is
Π2(p) ≡ αpDh(p) + (1 − α)pDl(p) − cDh(p). (1)
Proposition 2 Under forced availability, the optimal price quantity combi-
nation is (p,q) = (p∗
2,q∗
2) ≡ ((3 + α + 4c − 4t)/8,(5 − α − 4c − 4t)/8).





veals that under regulation the price is higher. This follows directly from
the simple fact that consumers’ willingness to pay is lower in the low state
of demand.
5 No Regulation
This section studies the ﬁrm’s optimal behavior when there is no regulation.
In this case, the ﬁrm will not choose a price quantity combination that leads
to an excess of demand in the low state; the ﬁrm would be better oﬀ oﬀering
9the same quantity at a higher price. Consequently, consumers are sure to
receive a product in the low state and it follows that demand in the low state
is Dl(p) = 3/4 − p − t. On the other hand, the ﬁrm will not choose a price
quantity combination, that results in an excess supply in the high state; it
leads to a number of unsold units in both the high and the low state.
It follows that the ﬁrm chooses a combination (p,q) such that it either
satisﬁes demand in both states, or rationing occurs for the high state only. If
rationing occurs, consumers are not sure to receive a product when they arrive
at the shop. When deciding about visiting the shop, a rational consumer will
consider this possibility explicitly. Given that a consumer believes to receive
a product with probability πe, his expected payoﬀ from buying the product
is πe(v − p) − t. Hence, a consumer with a willingness to pay that exceeds
¯ vh ≡ p + t/πe decides to visit the shop. Since the willingness to pay in the
high state is uniformly distributed over [0,1], demand is
Dh = 1 − p − t/π
e. (2)
Given the proportional rationing rule, the probability of receiving a product
is q/Dh. In a rational expectation equilibrium, the consumers’ beliefs are






Note that the demand in the high state depends positively on the produced
quantity q. This obtains, because a larger quantity increases the likelihood
that a consumer actually receives the product if he visits the shop.
The ﬁrm chooses a price quantity combination (p,q) that maximizes ex-
pected proﬁt. Since in the low state the ﬁrm sells only Dl(p) units, proﬁts
are Πl(p,q) = Dl(p)p−cq. In the high state, it sells all units so that its proﬁt
is Πh(p,q) = (p − c)q. Expected proﬁts are therefore
Π3(p,q) = α[(p − c)q] + (1 − α)[(3/4 − p − t)p − cq].
As discussed, the ﬁrm chooses a combination such that there is no excess
demand in the low state (q ≥ Dl(p)) and no excess supply in the high state
10(q ≤ Dh(p)). For a given price p this implies that the ﬁrm restricts its
quantity to the interval q ∈ [3/4 − p − t,1 − p − t]. Hence, given some price




Since Π(p,q) is linear in q, the optimal q is either 3/4 − p − t or 1 −
p − t. This insight reveals that the ﬁrm, eﬀectively, chooses between two
selling strategies. Either it concentrates on low demand and, as a direct
consequence, rations consumers in the high state. Or, it focuses on the high
state of demand and chooses a quantity which will satisfy the entire demand
in the high state. The optimal price quantity combination coincides therefore
either with the solution (p∗
1,q∗




It is intuitive that the ﬁrm’s optimal choice depends on the likelihood
that the state of demand is high; the higher the probability that demand is




(3 + 4c − 4t)2 + 16c − (3 + 4c − 4t).
We arrive at the following result:
Proposition 3 For α ≤ ¯ α the optimal price quantity combination is (p,q) =
(p∗
1,q∗
1) and leads to a rationing of consumers in the high state. For α > ¯ α
the price quantity combination (p,q) = (p∗
2,q∗
2) is optimal.
The proposition conﬁrms the intuition that the ﬁrm concentrates on the
low state of demand if and only if the likelihood of a high state of demand
is low enough (α < ¯ α).
116 The Eﬀect of Regulation
In order to evaluate the diﬀerent outcomes we address the welfare eﬀects of
regulation. For α > ¯ α regulation has no eﬀect, since the ﬁrm already chooses
a quantity that guarantees that demand is satisﬁed. Regulation in this case
is superﬂuous.
For α ≤ ¯ α the ﬁrm would like to ration consumers in the high state
of demand, but regulation forces it to serve all consumers. A priori it is,
however, unclear which of the two settings consumers prefer. The outcome
with rationing leads to lower prices, but at the risk of not receiving a product
in the high state. To arrive at a deﬁnite answer, I calculate the consumers’
surplus explicitly. First, without regulation rationing occurs in the high


















(3 + 2α − 4c + 4t)(3 − 4c − 4t)2
128(3 − 4c + 4t)
. (3)














= ((3 − 4c − 4t)
2 + 2α(5 − 4c − 4t) − 3α
2)/128. (4)
A direct comparison between CS1 and CS2 yields the following result:
Proposition 4 For any α ∈ (0,1] the ex ante expected consumers’ surplus
is strictly larger without rationing.
The proposition shows that, despite higher price, consumers always pre-
fer the outcome without rationing. Hence, when α < ¯ α, the preferences of
consumers and the ﬁrm contradict.20 When the ﬁrm’s decision about ra-
tioning is at the margin ¯ α, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent, while consumers have a
20This observation has the interesting implication that consumer pressure groups will
lobby in favor of regulation.
12strict preference not to ration. Consequently, the ﬁrm’s decision to ration
for somewhat smaller α is a suboptimal decision from a welfare perspective.
To investigate this more precisely we calculate the eﬀect of regulation on ex
ante expect social welfare, which is the sum of expected ex ante proﬁts and
the ex ante expected consumer surplus.











(16 + 16c − α) −
αt2





Again, the optimal behavior will depend on the likelihood of the high






φ(c,t)2 − c(3 − 4c + 4t)2/2
￿
3 − 4c + 4t
,
where
φ(c,t) ≡ (3 − c − 4c
2 + 4(1 + c)t − 8t
2).
Proposition 5 For α ∈ (˜ α, ¯ α] regulation increases ex ante expected social
welfare. For α < ˜ α regulation reduces ex ante expected social welfare. For
α > ¯ α regulation is superﬂuous.
The proposition shows that regulation is only beneﬁcial if the likelihood
of a high state of demand is not too small. Indeed, for α close to zero ensuring
availability for the high demand state is not beneﬁcial, since it occurs with
very small probability. In this case, regulation almost always causes excess
supply, which only increases costs. This illustrates that also from a social
welfare perspective there is a trade–oﬀ between producing too much in the
low state and producing too little in the high state. The only diﬀerence
is that the weights in the trade–oﬀ diﬀer; social welfare takes into account
the eﬀect on consumers’ surplus, whereas the ﬁrm neglects it. Since the
consumers’ surplus is greater without rationing, the diﬀerence implies that
the interval of values for α for which the ﬁrm rations customers is too large
from a social welfare perspective.





Figure 1: Diﬀerence in surpluses as a function of α.
Figure 1 summarizes the ﬁndings graphically. Since consumers always
prefer the regulated outcome, the curve ∆CS ≡ CS2 − CS1 lies in the
positive quadrant. For α = 0 the consumers are indiﬀerent about regulation
(∆CS = 0), because the ﬁrm sets identical prices and rationing occurs with
probability zero. The increasing curve ∆Π ≡ Π2 − Π1 reﬂects the fact that
the rationing strategy becomes less attractive as the probability of the high
state increases. Consequently, the rationing strategy yields higher proﬁts for
small α, whereas the ﬁrm prefers not to ration when α exceeds ¯ α. Since
welfare is the sum of consumers’ surplus and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, the curve ∆W
is simply the addition of ∆CS and ∆Π. Since both functions are quadratic
in α, also their addition ∆W is quadratic in α. Moreover, at ¯ α the ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent about rationing and the curve ∆W coincides with ∆CS and is,
therefore, positive. On the other hand, at ˜ α it holds ∆W = 0 implying that
∆CS and ∆Π just cancel each other out. The parabolic shape of ∆W then
implies that for the range (˜ α, ¯ α), expected social welfare is strictly higher
without rationing, while proﬁts are lower.
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that in a market with demand uncertainty a producer faces
a trade–oﬀ between rationing and overproduction. Rationally, the producer
14opts for rationing, when he perceives the probability of a high demand as
relatively low. From an eﬃciency point of view, his behavior is distorted,
because the producer does not take into account consumers’ surplus. This
leads the producer to opt for rationing too often. A regulation, such as a
guarantee of availability, that corrects this behavior is therefore potentially
beneﬁcial.
A guarantee of availability forces the discounter to produces enough units
for the high states of demand. Consequently, regulation results in more pro-
duction. In settings with imperfect competition, where ﬁrms tend to produce
ineﬃciently low quantities, such an increase in production enhances welfare.
However, regulation overshoots its goal of adjusting production closer to the
social optimum when the discounter must guarantee availability for states of
demand that are rather unlikely. In this case, more sophisticated regulation
is needed. A ﬁne–tuning of regulation by an imposition of ﬁnite ﬁnes rather
than an outright prohibition of rationing, seems therefore more appropriate.
Such ﬁnes may take the form of a compensation to rationed consumers; an
option suggested by the ministry of consumer protection. The compensa-
tion would make rationing a less favorable option for the ﬁrm and change
the trade–oﬀ in favor of more production. The possibility of ﬁne–tuning will
however be severely limited, because the regulator will have less information
about demand than the discounter. Also the enforcement of ﬁne–tuned rules
might be problematic.
The insight that the demand uncertainty leads to a trade–oﬀ between
too much and too little production also allows a possibility that a regulator
may actually prefer the ﬁrm to ration consumers. The results here were
obtained under the premise that the regulator and ﬁrm agree about the cost
of disposing unsold units. However, a diﬀerence in the ﬁrm’s and regulator’s
perception of these costs may aﬀect results. Speciﬁcally, if the regulator
attaches, due to ﬁrm–external eﬀects, a much higher cost to disposal than
the ﬁrm, qualitative results are reversed.21 In this case, the regulator sees
21Interestingly, the German minister, Ms. K¨ unast, who proposed the regulation belongs
to the ecological conscious green party.
15beneﬁts in forcing the ﬁrm to produce less waste, which eﬀectively implies
that the regulator forces the ﬁrm to ration consumers.
Finally, the paper presents a model of bargain sales by stressing the im-
portance of demand uncertainty. This is consistent with the empirical obser-
vation of rationing and excess supply. I used this model to investigate the
regulation of availability. Yet, the persistence and increasing popularity of
German bargain sales make it worthwhile to investigate this model further.
It seems especially important to extend the model by introducing competi-
tion. Currently there exist up to seven discounters that are actively using
the business model of bargain sales. Anecdotic evidence suggests that, while
competition has increased, the problem of rationing has declined and the
problem of excess supply has increased. It is an open question whether this
is indeed a result of increased competition or merely reﬂects a temporary
adjustment of the industry. Another open question concerns the demand un-
certainty itself. Since the discounter is hurt by the uncertainty, it may look
for active strategies to mitigate it. The discounter may, for instance, use
repeated sales to test and acquire information about prospective demand.
Such investigations may lead to a theory of optimal repeated sales that helps
to understand the dynamics of German bargain sales.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: From p∗
1 it directly follows q = Dl(p∗
1) = (3−4c−
4t)/8. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Substitution of the demand functions Dl(p) and
Dh(p) into (1) and maximization with respect to p1 yields the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Due to the linearity of Π(p,q) in q, the optimal q
is either 3/4 − p − t or 1 − p − t.
For q = 3/4 − p − t the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
Π3(p,3/4 − p − t) = (p − c)(3 − 4p − 4t)/4.
16First order condition with respect to p are suﬃcient and yield p∗
1 = (3+4c−
4t)/8 with quantity q∗





1) = (3 − 4c − 4t)
2/64. (6)
For q = 1 − p − t the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
Π3(p,1 − p − t) = p(3 + α − 4p − 4t)/4 − c(1 − p − t).
First order condition with respect to p are suﬃcient and yield p∗
2 = (3+α+
4c − 4t)/8 with quantity q∗





2) = (9 + α
2 − 40c + 2α(3 + 4c − 4t) − 24t + 16(c + t)
2)/64. (7)









1) = α(6 + α + 8c − 8t)/64 − c/4.
which is negative for α ∈ [0, ¯ α) and positive for α > ¯ α. Q.E.D.




12 − 16c − α(9 − 12c + 12t) + 64t − 64t(c + t)
128(3 − 4c + 4t)/α
.
It is positive if the numerator is positive. We show that the minimum of the
numerator
12 − 16c − α(9 − 12c + 12t) + 64t − 64t(c + t) (8)
is positive. To see this, note that it holds ∂∆CS/∂c = 12α−16−64t < 0 so
that the numerator is falling in c. Since the parameter c lies in the interval
[0,min{3/4 − t,1/2 + t}], the minimum occurs either for c = 3/4 − t or
c = 1/2 + t. For c = 3/4 − t expression (8) simpliﬁes to 8(4 − 3α)t which
is positive. For c = 1/2 + t the expression reduces to 4 − 3α + 16t − 128t2,
which itself is more than 1 + 16t − 128t2. As c = 1/2 + t and c < 3/4 + t
implies that t ≤ 1/8 the expression is positive. Hence, both candidates for a
minimum of (8) are positive, so that ∆CS is positive itself for all parameter
constellations. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Follows from the observation that (5) is positive
if and only if α ∈ (˜ α, ¯ α]. Q.E.D.
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